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Abstract. This paper brings together the literatures on the political economy of public 
expenditures and the determinants of economic growth. Based on a new dataset of rural 
public expenditures in a panel of Latin American economies, the econometric evidence 
suggests that non-social subsidies reduce agricultural GDP. Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests that political and institutional factors as well as income inequality are 
determinants of the size and structure of rural public expenditures, through which they 
have large and significant effects on agricultural GDP. 
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I. Introduction 
  Agricultural growth, and therefore good economic policy in the rural sector, is 
crucial to national welfare. Rural areas in Latin America are especially underdeveloped: 
rural poverty rates are twice as high as in the cities, illiteracy and school dropout rates are 
substantially higher, and access to safe drinking water is 30% lower. A large portion of 
the total population in Latin America (especially the poor) directly or indirectly depends 
on agriculture and related rural activities for its sustenance (López and Valdés 2000). 
Furthermore, growth in the rural agricultural economy has strong growth linkages to 
other sectors (de Ferranti et al 2005, Ravallion 1996, Timmer 2002).  
Much popular and academic attention to the rural economy has focused on the 
impact of trade policy and of other government interventions that directly distort relative 
prices. Less is understood, however, about the impact of other domestic policies that do 
not directly distort markets. One such policy is the way in which governments spend 
public revenues, including the size of expenditures devoted to rural areas and the 
composition of those expenditures.  
  This paper examines the effects of the size and composition of rural expenditures 
on agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) for 15 Latin American countries between 
1985 and 2001. Specifically, our measure of the composition of government expenditures 
is the share devoted to the provision of non-social subsidies, or private goods. In our rural 
public expenditure data, this category included all spending on export subsidies, internal 
commercialization, forestry subsidies, and targeted rural production subsidies. Other 
categories were in practice not possible to fully define as non-social subsidies, as the 
actual public projects executed were of varying types. One-half of expenditures on  2  
irrigation, integrated rural development, and land purchases and expropriations were thus 
categorized as non-social subsidies. The remaining expenditures include public goods 
satisfying the non-excludability and non-rivalry criteria as well as other spending that 
mitigates the effects of evident market failures, such as investment in R&D, plant and 
animal disease control, and environmental protection. This binary classification is 
intended to represent whether or not expenditures fulfill the classical role of government, 
although some expenditures classified as private non-social subsidies could have 
significant social returns when the subsidized activities have externalities. For instance, 
export subsidies could have high social returns if the act of exporting by one firm leads 
other firms to learn how to export. If these ambiguities exist in the data, then the 
empirical analyses should pick them up and we should not find evidence that the two 
types of expenditures have differential effects on agricultural production.  
To the extent that public goods can only be supplied by the state and are likely to 
be complementary with private investment, whereas government-provided private goods 
can be supplied by the private sector, a plausible hypothesis is that public expenditure 
patterns that are biased in favor of private goods or subsidies may be deleterious to 
economic growth. A corollary is that the effectiveness of government expenditures in 
generating growth diminishes with a higher share of private goods in such expenditures. 
We will test the prediction that switching government expenditures from public to private 
goods hampers economic growth.  
The paper begins in the traditional framework of cross-country growth regressions 
such as Barro (1991) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and then deals with common 
concerns with such analyses. We carefully deal with unobserved and observed  3  
heterogeneity across countries and measure the political and institutional factors that 
shape economic policy. This approach addresses the potential endogeneity of rural public 
expenditures with respect to agricultural GDP by using instruments for such variables 
that are consistent with the analyses of Persson (2002), Milesi-Feretti et al (2001), 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), and Esteban and Ray (2006). The resulting analysis thus 
addresses Rodrik’s (2005) critique of cross-country growth regressions that do not 
explicitly model the policymaking process. This approach can also ameliorate estimation 
biases due to any measurement errors in the expenditure data.  
  The empirical evidence indicates that, while keeping total expenditures constant, 
governments can boost agricultural GDP by decreasing the share of their expenditures 
devoted to non-social subsidies and increasing the share of expenditures for rural public 
goods and social services. The results provide quantitative estimates of the effects of 
economic and political institutions on that share. While the findings are intuitive, the 
paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it takes the traditional growth 
literature and applies it to the rural sector using a new dataset showing the importance of 
not only the size but especially of the composition of public expenditures on the growth 
rate of agricultural income. Second, it bridges the gap between research in political 
economy and growth by exploring the political and institutional determinants of public 
rural expenditures.  
  The subsequent section reviews the existing literature in the fields of growth 
empirics and political economy of public expenditures. Section III introduces the 
production function and econometric approach that bring the two fields together. The 
dataset is described in Section IV. The regression results are presented in section V,  4  
which begins with cross-country regressions on agricultural GDP per capita and finishes 
with the results from a three-stage least squares estimation that uses political economy 
variables as instruments for the endogenous public rural expenditure variables. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the results and a discussion of a broader research agenda. 
 
II. Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Conceptual and Empirical Issues  
Two fundamental issues have been addressed in the literature: the effects of fiscal 
policy on growth and the determinants of fiscal policy. Though the former literature has 
been concerned about the possible endogenous nature of fiscal policy and have often used 
instrumental variables, they have not used structural models to analyze the emergence of 
fiscal policy patterns. The second literature has used political economy and institutional 
models to study how fiscal policy arises.  
 
How Fiscal Policy Affects Economic Growth  
Drawing on the pioneering study of Barro (1991), several empirical studies have 
subsequently examined the effects of government expenditures on growth (Anschauer 
1989; Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Evans and Karras 1994; Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou 
1996; Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell 1999;   Bose, Haque, and Osborne 2003)
4. 
                                                 
4 Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996), Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2003), and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
use cross-country panel data with government expenditures disaggregated by sector, but get conflicting 
results. Bose et al find positive growth effects from government capital expenditures and education 
expenditures, while Devarajan et al find that current expenditures speed growth while defense and capital 
expenditures slow it down. Easterly and Rebelo found that only transportation and communication 
investments significantly increase growth.   
  Another segment of the literature attempts to define government expenditures as productive or 
unproductive depending on whether they enter a private-sector production function. Kneller, Bleaney, and 
Gemmell (1999) use a panel of 22 OECD countries from 1970 to 1995 to test the growth implications of 
the financing and allocation of fiscal expenditures. They find that productive government expenditures, 
including education, health, and defense spending, enhance growth, whereas unproductive expenditures,  5  
Government expenditures have been categorized according to various criteria: current vs. 
capital expenditures, productive versus unproductive expenditures, and disaggregated 
into sectors such as transportation, health care, social security, and education. Despite 
conceptual reasons for dividing government expenditures into public versus private 
goods, we are aware of only one previous study that has used such a dichotomy (López 
2005).  The cross-country growth framework has previously been applied to the 
agricultural sector, for example in Mundlak (1997). López (2005) does so as well, 
focusing on the influence of rural government expenditures, including their composition 
in terms of public goods and private goods, using an earlier version of the FAO data. The 
present paper begins with a similar approach but also considers the political economy and 
institutional determinants of the composition of government expenditures. The 
consideration of the political and institutional factors that shape public expenditures 
follows Rodrik’s (2005) recommendation that research should seriously consider the 
motivations of policymakers, which is seldom done in cross-country work. Our approach 
allows us to obtain insights on why some governments are more or less prone to spend on 
public goods. At the same time, this allows us to deal with the endogenous nature of 
government expenditures in a structural approach rather than using ad-hoc instruments. 
In sum, there is a fairly extensive body of literature addressing the effects of fiscal 
variables on economic growth. There is, however, little agreement on exactly which 
expenditures promote growth, there is a smaller literature on public expenditures in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
such as social security, do not. Itit is not clear a priori in some cases which outlays should be viewed as 
“productive.” Defense expenditures, for example, would not enter any standard private sector production 
function, but Kneller et al follow Barro in claiming that such outlays are “productive” because they aid the 
maintenance of property rights. Several studies use datasets other than cross-country panels to examine the 
effects of the disposition of public expenditures (Anschauer 1989, Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995, 
Evans and Karras 1994).  6  
rural sector, and there is no literature that breaks down fiscal expenditures into public 
goods versus private goods while considering their institutional and political roots.  
 
Political Economy Determinants of Public Expenditures 
 There is significant theoretical and empirical literature in political economy that 
examines the role of institutional, economic, and demographic variables in shaping the 
size of government and the composition of expenditures. This literature relies on two 
types of theories. The first focuses on structural characteristics of the political 
constitution as exogenous determinants of government spending. This literature includes 
electoral competition models and legislative bargaining models. The second strand of the 
literature investigates how historical distribution of wealth may affect the influence of 
economic groups on government policies and expenditures, for example through 
lobbying.
5 Although the distribution of wealth can act through the first model by 
affecting broader political institutions, there are direct mechanisms through which wealth 
distribution may affect government policies. That is, similar political institutions may 
engender different government policies under different wealth distribution conditions.      
Electoral Competition Models. Electoral competition models assume that 
candidates make promises to voters and financial supporters in order to maximize their 
chances of election. Much of this literature focuses on the effects of the degree of 
“proportionality,” which is the degree to which the representation of political parties in 
government reflects the percentages of the national vote that they garnered.  
                                                 
5 In addition, another literature focuses on the relationships between public expenditures and certain 
economic variables such as (lagged) per capita GDP (Wagner’s law), business fluctuations, unemployment 
and others (Kneller et al 1999; Devarajan and Zan 1996.; Evans and Karras 1994).  7  
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2001) compare a theoretical “majoritarian” 
system, in which a group of politicians from the same “social group” represent different 
geographical constituencies, to a fully proportional system, in which multiple “social 
groups” represent the same national constituency. In the former case, politicians more 
easily agree on expenditures targeted on their favored social groups than on 
geographically-targeted public goods, so the electorate has the incentive to vote for 
politicians who have stronger preferences for geographically-targeted public goods. The 
opposite incentives hold for the proportional system, resulting in relatively more 
spending on transfers targeted at social groups. Using a dataset of 20 OECD and 20 Latin 
American countries, the authors find that those with the most proportional systems have 
the lowest expenditure share on public goods.
 6  
  A subset of the electoral competition theory models political business cycles, 
under the hypothesis that policy will change as an election nears, because politicians have 
a more immediate need to garner support, and voters discount other events happening in 
the past or future (Persson 2002; Alesina et.al. 1997). The magnitude of these policy 
changes should increase as the election draws nearer or the outcome becomes more in 
doubt.
 7  
                                                 
6 By contrast, Persson and Tabellini (1999) develop a distinct model showing that majoritarian elections 
require parties to target expenditures more specifically, not just on marginal voters but on marginal voters 
in marginal districts. This increased need for targeting in majoritarian systems reduces expenditures on 
public goods, which they view as being less targetable and define somewhat differently from Milesi-
Ferretti et al. They then show more transfers in majoritarian systems with cross-sectional data from 50 
countries.  
7 Persson (2002) finds fiscal changes over the election cycle for 61 countries over 39 years and larger 
expenditures on targeted programs in election years in majoritarian systems. In a time series study of the 
United States, however, Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) find no relationship between transfers or 
economic growth and the timing of the next election.  
  8  
Legislative Bargaining Models. The legislative bargaining model focuses on the 
effects of the makeup of parliament on fiscal policy, independent of promises made 
before the election. Given that each party in the legislature has its own favored projects 
targeted at its constituency, the model predicts that a coalition of parties sufficient to pass 
a budget will include more expenditures and a higher proportion of targetable outlays. 
Empirical specifications are similar to tests of the electoral competition models. 
Scartascini and Crain (2002), for example, use cross-country panel data to show that the 
number of political parties increases both the size of government and the percentage of 
expenditures that are subsidies and transfers as opposed to public goods. Significantly, 
they find that proportional representation systems result in relatively more expenditures 
on public goods. 
Collective Action and Accountability Models. There is in addition a literature on 
collective action, which is the process by which interest groups pursue specific policy 
goals to benefit their members. In a review of the theory on the provision of public goods 
to the poor, Keefer and Khemani (2005) write that the political incentives to provide 
public services require that voters have good information about public services and that 
they are able to organize collectively to exert their preferences in voting or lobbying. 
Freedom of the press, the number of newspapers and other media outlets, and the literacy 
rate should influence information, while the ethnic, linguistic or geographical 
fractionalization of the populace and the size of electoral districts can influence ability to 
organize. This fundamentally represents the extent to which policymakers are 
accountable to the populace.
8 
                                                 
8 Keefer and Khemani (2005) additionally emphasize the importance of credibility of political promises, 
which is related to the time preferences of voters and politicians. The time horizons and discount rates are  9  
Wealth Distribution Models. Wealth distribution is a factor often linked to 
economic growth.  The earlier literature generally postulated a negative relationship 
between equality and economic growth (Okun 1975). Until recently, this conclusion had 
been rarely supported by solid empirical evidence. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti 
(1996), and Persson and Tabellini (1994), among others have used cross-country 
reduced-form econometric estimates to show that wealth and income concentration tend 
to depress subsequent economic growth.
9  Aghion et. al (1999) concluded that while the 
earlier literature on economic development emphasized exactly the opposite effect of 
inequality on growth, the available cross-country evidence is quite unambiguous in 
showing a negative effect of inequality on growth.  Explanations for this result focus on 
how inequality may magnify the negative effects of credit market failures on asset 
accumulation and, therefore, on growth (Aghion et.al. 1999).  
In addition, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) advance 
a political economy link: Assuming that elections are won by a representative voter it 
follows that more inequality leads to elected officials that favor higher taxes and other 
distributive fiscal policy to “do something” about inequality as the representative voter is 
poorer when income is more concentrated. Higher taxes, according to these authors, are 
bad for investment and therefore for growth. This story, however, suggests that 
redistributive fiscal policy reduces growth which, as pointed out by Aghion et.al. (1999), 
                                                                                                                                                 
important, as capital expenditures, which might be weighted toward public goods, provide benefits over 
time. Thus political stability, tenure of politicians, and the timing of the election cycle are important 
variables.  
9 In addition, casual empirical evidence of the role of wealth distribution on economic growth exists.  
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) have compared the historical experience of North America versus that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean suggesting that wealth distribution differences are mainly explained by 
deep historical events early on in colonial times and that such differences have remained in time over 
several centuries and have explained in part why British North America has been economically successful 
while the rest of the Americas has not.  World Bank (1993) also provided such casual evidence in the 
context of East Asia.  10 
is inconsistent with existing empirical evidence. In particular, several studies have shown 
that various fiscal measures of redistribution, such as social spending and marginal versus 
average tax rates, if anything induce faster economic growth (Easterly and Rebelo 1993, 
Perotti 1996).   
In this study we empirically test another political economy explanation for the 
negative correlation between growth and inequality: inequality allows the capture of 
politicians and voters such that more private goods are provided and aggregate growth 
consequently declines. Wealth concentration means that the lobbying by the elites to 
capture politicians will be greater than that of the non-elite as long as lobbying 
expenditures are proportional to income. In addition, voters can be captured to re-elect 
politicians or parties that favor the elite. This hypothesis is the opposite of the Alesina-
Rodrik view, suggesting that inequality may allow the elite to influence the rest of the 
electorate through the media, think tanks, professional organizations, and the like. If 
inequality allows the elite more political influence, then inequality should be positively 
correlated with non-social subsidies, of which the elites are able to appropriate a 
significant part, and less correlated with expenditures on public goods, of which the elites 
might appropriate a smaller share.
10 If non-social subsidies hamper economic growth, we 
will thus have shown an additional pathway through which inequality slows the 
economy. Indeed, our empirical model discussed below is consistent with Esteban and 
Ray (2006), who present a theoretical model where inequality distorts public resource 
allocation as a consequence of political lobbying by vested interests, even when there is 
not corruption in government.  
                                                 
10 López (2003) provided indirect inductive evidence supporting the view that wealth concentration leads to 
public policies that tend to be systematically biased against the poor, including public expenditures 
characterized by meager investments in public goods.  11 
  In summary, the literature is in agreement that a set of institutional, demographic, 
and economic variables affect the size and composition of public expenditures: political 
accountability, institutions such as proportionality, time horizons of governments, 
electoral fiscal cycles, and political economy processes arising from the wealth 
distribution. There is, however, disagreement as to the expected direction of influence of 
the above factors on economic growth. This paper is thus a cross-over between two areas 
that have been explored before – the influence of public finance on growth, and the 
political economy of fiscal expenditures – where there is an accepted set of questions and 
methodologies but little agreement on conclusions.  
 
III. Methodology 
This paper seeks to determine the influence of the share of rural expenditures 
devoted to subsidies on agricultural GDP growth and to test various hypotheses about the 
determinants of the structure of public expenditures. This section describes the theoretical 
background and the empirical strategies used to estimate our model. 
  We model the agricultural GDP as a Cobb-Douglas function in steady state, but 
allow for an interaction between total rural public expenditures and the exponential of its 
share of non-social expenditures. This specification allows for an intuitive interpretation 
of the empirical model. More formally, the proposed GDP function can be written as: 
 




ρ ,          ( 1 )  
  12 
where  Y is agricultural GDP per capita (in rural areas); A is the level of technical 
efficiency, S is the share of non-social subsidies in total public rural expenditures, G 
represents total government expenditures per capita in rural areas; and N is the hectares of 
arable land per rural capita. Finally, X is a vector of controls such as agricultural prices, 
soil quality, and weather conditions. The superscripts are coefficients to be estimated.  
Rewriting equation (1) in log-linear form results in the following empirical model: 
 
lnY = ln A + ξ S + γ ln G + θ ln N + ρ ln X     (2) 
 
We estimate equation (2) using the following time series specification,  
 
  lnYi,t = ln A + ξ Si,t + γ ln Gi,t + θ ln Ni,t + ρ ln X’i,t + ni + Tt + εi,t  ,     (3) 
 
where X’ is the time-varying, observable subset of X. ln A is again a parameter reflecting 
overall technical efficiency of agricultural production that is common across all countries 
in the sample, and is thus captured by the intercept or constant in the econometric 
estimations.  ni  represents country-specific characteristics that might result in cross-
country heterogeneity in the estimated levels of technical efficiency. Tt represents a time 
effect that is common to all countries, which allows for over-time variation in technical 
efficiency. εi,t is a standard white-noise error, with  f ( εi,t | {lnA, S, lnG, lnN, lnX } ) = 
Normal (0,1).  In this setup, the estimated coefficients are assumed to be homogenous 
across all countries, which mean that in practice we are estimating the average effects of 
the explanatory variables on agricultural GDP per rural capita for our sample of Latin  13 
American countries.
11 This model can be restated by using land instead of rural 
population (labor force) as the denominator in Y and G, as well as labor per hectare of 
arable land instead of land per rural capita, and we report results for this specification 
with various estimators in the Appendix. 
  We apply four estimators to test the sensitivity of the coefficients to various 
restrictions and assumptions. The first country fixed-effects estimator relies on the 
assumption that ni is unobservable. The second is the random effects estimator, with the 
identifying restriction that ni = 0. To take advantage of the efficiency of the random 
effects estimator while addressing cross-country heterogeneity, we then estimate the 
model in a quasi-fixed effects framework, where ni is approximated by a vector of time-
invariant variables capturing geography and weather that influence the level of 
agricultural GDP per rural capita. Fourth, to test the consistency of the estimators given 
the potential autoregressivity of Y, we use a dynamic version of the empirical models that 
includes the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. This dynamic model estimated 
with the GMM system estimators proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) use the second lag of the dependent variable as an instrument for its first 
lag.
12  
  These specifications echo López (2005), but use a broader and updated dataset 
covering 15 instead of 10 countries. We then depart from López (2005) by explaining G 
and S through a more structured political economy model rather than merely using ad-hoc 
                                                 
11 It is possible that there might be international heterogeneity in the coefficients, but allowing for this 
extreme form of heterogeneity for all relevant parameters makes the estimation of consistent parameters 
with instrumental variables implausibly complicated.  
12 The system estimator is a weighted average of two simultaneous equations. One is the model in 
differences with levels of Yi,t-2 as an IV for the change in Yi,t-1. Note that  0 ) , ( 2 , , = ∆ − t i t i Y E ε . The second 
equation is in levels, but the IV is  1 , − ∆ t i Y . Note that  . 0 ) , ( 1 , , = ∆ − t i t i Y E ε  
  14 
instruments to control for the likely endogenous nature of such variables. This allows us 
to empirically test the hypotheses discussed in the previous section on political 
institutions and wealth distribution.  
The political economy literature discussed in the previous section suggests six 
potential factors determining the size and composition of rural public expenditures. For 
the reasons discussed in the previous section, the wealth inequality hypothesis suggests 
that, given the above political and institutional factors, a more unequal society will lead to 
a greater share of subsidies in government expenditures. For total rural expenditures, the 
effect of income inequality is in general ambiguous, depending on the significance of 
rural wealth in total wealth. The greater is the size of the rural wealth vis-à-vis total 
wealth the more likely is that the elites will be dominated by the rural interests and, 
hence, the more likely is, ceteris paribus, that rural expenditures increase with greater 
economic inequality.    
The Electoral Competition theory suggests the use of two types of factors 
explaining fiscal expenditures. The political budget cycle theory suggests that 
expenditures, as well as the share of subsidies directed toward key electoral groups, will 
be higher as elections approach. Longer time horizons should induce politicians to make 
more investments in public goods, which have payoffs that are delayed, instead of 
investing in immediate transfers such as non-social subsidies. The Rules channel suggests 
that the proportional electoral systems will have different public expenditure outcomes 
than majoritarian systems, and presidential regimes will have different outcomes than 
parliamentary systems.   15 
The Accountability channel suggests that governance will improve as politicians 
are held accountable for their actions, so accountability should increase the provision of 
public goods and social services relative to non-social subsidies that are often targeted at 
wealthier landowners. In addition, we consider a technocracy factor intended to capture 
the extent to which policy makers are technically trained, which might cause fiscal policy 
to more closely reflect economic theory.
13  
  We test the influence of these channels in a random effects framework using 
control variables suggested by the literature, such as the share of population over 65 years 
old, trade over GDP ratio, and per capita GDP, that also may influence the share of 
subsidies and the magnitude of public expenditures.  Our empirical model is: 
 
{G , S} =   β0 + β1 · Electionsi,t + β2 · Wealth Distributioni,t + β3 ·  Time Horizoni,t + β4 ·  
Rulesi,t + β5 ·  Accountabilityi,t + β6 ·  Technocracyi,t + β7 ·  Controlsi,t + εi,t   (4) 
 
In turn, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to assess the determinants of G and S as 
well as their effects on Y. The 3SLS regressions simultaneously estimate three equations: 
equation (4) with both G and S as the dependent variables, and equation (3).  This system 
of equations is over-identified, and the identification of the effects of G and S on Y comes 
from the differential effects of the instrumental variables on these endogenous variables. 
Furthermore, this approach combined with the quasi-fixed effects provide consistent 
                                                 
13 There is a substantial literature on the influence of foreign-trained economists on Latin American public 
policies. See, for example, Dominguez (1997).   16 
estimates in a context where most of the cross sectional variation in agricultural GDP is 
explained by the control variables.
14  
 
IV. Data and Empirical Implementation 
  With the exception of the rural public expenditure data, the variables in equation 
(3) are straightforward. As mentioned, the normalizing variable is the total rural 
population. Some measure of rural labor force, as opposed to population, would be 
preferable, but there are few ages or groups of people that do not do some sort of work in 
rural economies, so total rural population is a reasonable proxy. The vector X of controls 
comprises several variables: non-agricultural GDP, which is used to capture country-
specific macroeconomic shocks that affect demand and supply of agricultural goods (e.g., 
balance of payments and financial crises), openness (or the ratio of trade to GDP), and 
the divisia price index for each country’s agricultural production. This annual price index 
was calculated for each country by combining agricultural production data with world 
commodity prices from the World Bank. The final time-varying variable in the vector X 
is a dummy variable for observations affected by Hurricane Mitch; it takes the value 1 in 
1999 for Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama and 0 for all other observations.  
The quasi-fixed effects specification of equation (3) calls for a vector ni of 
exogenous, static variables that explain cross-country variation in agricultural GDP per 
capita. Drawing from the literature on geography and economic growth, especially 
Gallup and Sachs (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1997), we include six variables. The 
percent of land area in every country suitable for each of six staple crops was measured 
                                                 
14 Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations yielded virtually identical results as the 3SLS. This suggests 
that potential biases in the 3SLS (caused by model mis-specification or measurement errors in the data) 
coefficients in equations (3) and (4) are not severe. In this context, 3SLS is preferable over 2SLS.   17 
based on soil characteristics, and soil quality was measured by including the highest and 
second highest of the six percentages. Also included were percent of land area in the 
geographical tropics, the average elevation in meters, the log of the average precipitation 
observed between 1980 and 2000, and a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization to 
capture risks of social instability which can be a source of economic uncertainty. In 
random effects regressions, these six variables alone explain 79% of the variation 
between countries in agricultural GDP per capita. 
 The  variables  G and S form the cornerstone of this analysis. They are derived 
from an expanded and revised version of the Rural Public Expenditures dataset provided 
by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Spending is 
disaggregated into 33 categories, with annual data for 20 countries going back to 1985. 
The first version of the data, made available at the end of 2003, contained ten countries 
and was used by López (2005). The most recent dataset contains more countries and 
changes the data for some of the original ten (see Rural Expenditures Data Appendix for 
more details about the new data).  
Table I presents descriptive statistics of all the variables. Appendix I lists all data 
sources and definitions. Table II (see also Chart I) shows that rural government 
expenditures per rural capita range from a low of $17 per year in Honduras to $1,154 per 
year in Uruguay, with subsidies comprising a minimum average share of 8% of 
expenditures (in Honduras) and a maximum of 84% (in Brazil). On average, governments 
reduced the share of expenditures devoted to non-social subsidies over the period, 
moving from 40-45% in the late 1980s to 30% in 2001. Average rural public 
expenditures increased from $130 to $190 per capita over the period.  18 
   Each concept in equation (4) could be represented by a number of data series. For 
wealth distribution we use a proxy for the initial level of wealth inequality, namely the 
national average of the Gini index for all available observations predating our sample 
period. These data come from Deininger and Squire (1996). It is noteworthy that these 
authors found little significant variation over time in the Gini index within countries. This 
suggests a high level of persistence in income distribution over the course of history. This 
persistence is, in turn, also consistent with Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2002) view that 
inequality in the Americas was heavily influenced by factor endowments during colonial 
times.  
 For Elections, we used a dummy that takes the value of 1 in presidential election 
years and 0 otherwise. This proved to be equally predictive as the number of years until 
the next election and a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the year before the presidential 
election. Time Horizon was represented by the Years of Democratic Stability of the 
country, assuming that politicians in more stable countries would have longer time 
horizons, while those in unstable countries might be more prone to engage in short-term, 
targeted spending. We used the square root of the number of years of consecutive 
democratic rule to represent the potential declining marginal impact of stability. 
Limitations in degrees of freedom requires the imposition of some structure on this 
variable, and since some data points have zero years of democratic rule, the natural log 
function could not be used. 
Two separate measures were included in the vector of Rules. As in Persson’s 
research, we used a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in presidential regimes and 0 
in parliamentary systems. In our sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries after  19 
the mid-1980s, only Jamaica has a parliamentary regime for the entire period. This 
coefficient may thus be biased by other unobserved factors in Jamaica. The second 
measure of electoral Rules is Proportionality. We derived our Proportionality variable by 
multiplying a dummy that takes the value 1 in countries with proportional electoral 
systems with a variable that captures the average number of seats in each national 
legislative electoral district.
15 The empirical and theoretical findings in Persson (2002) 
suggest that Presidential regimes have smaller governments and more spending on 
targeted non-social subsidies. The Proportionality variable should have the opposite 
effects. 
   Accountability was also captured by a vector of variables intended to capture the 
extent to which the populace can influence policy outcomes. Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization should be inversely related to the ability of the populace to organize and 
influence policy, and thus might be inversely related to rural spending and positively 
related to provision of subsidies. Freedom of the Press, as rated by the NGO Freedom 
House, and the extent of Political Competition, as determined by the Database of Political 
Institutions, should improve Accountability and thus have the opposite effects as Ethno-
linguistic Fractionalization. 
  We measure the strength of the Technocracy with the proportion of students that 
was educated in the United States. Specifically, we divided the number of students from a 
country enrolled in US colleges and universities by its working-age population. Our 
variable was the average of that proportion lagged 20-24 years, which is the approximate 
                                                 
15 Specifically, the average number of seats in each electoral district was calculated by averaging the mean 
district size in the national house with the mean district size in the national senate, as reported by the 
Database of Political Institutions. In the United States, this variable would take the value 1.5, as the mean 
House and Senate district sizes are 1 and 2, respectively. Since the U.S. does not have proportional 
representation, the Proportionality variable would take the value 0.  20 
time that an individual might take to go from being a student to having the most 
significant influence on economic policy.  
 
V. Results 
  Table III shows the results for equation (3) using the four different estimators, 
with variables normalized by rural population. In all cases, the results indicate that a 
higher share of non-social subsidies reduces agricultural GDP, although the coefficients 
vary substantially. Other variables also have the expected signs: government spending 
dedicated to rural areas, non-agricultural GDP, agricultural land, and not suffering from a 
hurricane are all associated with higher agricultural GDP. The signs on the agricultural 
price index and openness are not stable across the different estimators. 
  Tests to assure the validity of the different estimators have satisfactory results. 
First, normalizing by land area instead of rural population gives coefficients of very 
similar magnitudes, especially for the subsidy variable (compare Table III with Table 
AIII in the Appendix). Second, the random effects specification passes the Hausman test 
when normalized by population, and the estimated coefficients of the two rural 
expenditures variables are very similar in fixed effects and random effects. Third, the 
GMM-system estimator passes both the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments and 
the test for second-order autocorrelation.
 16 
    Though the instruments in the GMM-system estimator seem appropriate, we 
focus now in a more systematic and structural analysis of the simultaneous determination 
of per capita GDP and the fiscal variables. Table IV shows the results from the 3SLS 
                                                 
16 The null of the Sargan test is that the instruments (namely, the second lag of agricultural GDP per capita) 
are correlated with the regression errors. The null of the serial correlation test is that the errors are serially 
correlated.  In both cases a p-value greater than 0.05 suggests that the estimates are consistent.   21 
estimator. An important result is that the coefficients on both the subsidy share in rural 
expenditures and total expenditures per capita retain their signs, and moreover their 
magnitudes are greater and their significance stronger than the corresponding OLS 
estimates. This is evidence that these variables are not exogenous. Growth in agricultural 
GDP per capita seems to decrease government expenditures in the rural sector, thus 
biasing downward the coefficient in the one-stage regressions. It similarly appears that 
growth in agricultural GDP increases the subsidy share in rural expenditures, biasing the 
absolute value of the coefficient downward.  It is also possible that the use of 
instrumental variables may have helped to address attenuation bias caused by classical 
measurement errors in the rural public expenditures dataset, which would bias the 
absolute value of both coefficients downward.  
  Wealth inequality and several of the political and institutional instruments are 
important determinants of the level and structure of government expenditures in rural 
areas.  We confirm our hypothesis that inequality raises the share of subsidies in total 
expenditures as shown by the positive and highly significant coefficient of inequality on 
the subsidy share, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Esteban and Ray 
(2006). In addition, greater inequality causes, ceteris paribus, a rise in the total 
government allocation to the rural sector. This may suggest that the economic power of 
the national elites associated with greater wealth concentration may be at least shared by 
the rural elites, so that the share of subsidies may be associated not only with substitution 
of subsidies for rural public goods but also to incremental or new expenditures in the 
rural sector.         22 
Table AIV in the Appendix reports the first stage regressions. One interesting 
feature of these regressions, as well as the third stage regressions, is the negative 
coefficient of log Agricultural Price Index on both government subsidy share and total 
rural expenditures. This is consistent with the use of subsidies and rural expenditures to 
counter the effects of adverse price changes and may partially explain the lack of 
significance of the log Agricultural Price Index variable in the single-equation 
regressions. Hence it is possible that counter-cyclical expenditures and subsidies with 
respect to fluctuations of relative prices are used by Latin American and Caribbean 
governments as a form of insurance for agricultural producers.
17 But this benign 
interpretation of the use of private subsidies is only valid if the private sector does not 
provide insurance or if credit markets are imperfect. Nevertheless, the fact that the share 
of subsidies in public rural expenditures has a negative effect on agricultural output 
implies that the provision of subsidies is an inefficient form of insurance.   
  Table V summarizes the effects of all the explanatory variables, including quasi-
fixed effects variables and slow-moving institutional variables, on agricultural GDP per 
capita, which are due to direct effects (first column) or to indirect effects that act through 
the influence of the explanatory variables on the value of total rural public expenditures 
per capita or on its share of private subsidies. The P-Value column indicates the statistical 
significance of a test that the total effect of each variable on agricultural GDP per capita 
in the 3SLS specification is different from zero. The subsequent columns show the means 
and standard deviations of each variable in the sample used for the estimations.  
Of the time-invariant variables, Percent Land Area in Tropics has the greatest 
influence on between-country differences in agricultural GDP per capita. In some cases, 
                                                 
17 We thank Marcelo Olarreaga for raising this issue.   23 
the instrumental variables affect per capita agricultural GDP through channels that we did 
not predict a priori. For example, Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization directly increases 
agricultural GDP per capita, but also reduces subsidies and reduces rural public 
expenditures. The latter effect outweighs the former two, and an increase of one cross-
country standard deviation (21%) in Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization is associated with 
a 17% decrease in agricultural GDP per capita. When the president’s party controls all 
houses, both rural subsidies and total expenditures decrease, with the latter channel 
dominating the effect on agricultural GDP. This may be evidence of an anti-rural bias at 
the national level: when presidents have had more control over policy, they have reduced 
rural spending, thereby reducing agricultural production.  The results summarized in 
Table V also suggest that the effects of public expenditure choices can be substantial. The 
evidence implies that a reduction in the share of subsidies in rural expenditures by one 
(within-country) standard deviation can increase agricultural GDP per capita by 5%. 
Increasing per capita rural government expenditures by one (within-country) standard 
deviation increases per capita agricultural GDP by 12%. In contrast, trade openness has a 
negligible effect on per capita agricultural GDP, although trade policy issues related to 
agriculture have received tremendous public attention.  
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
The calculation above is an important highlight of this paper. As one would 
expect, rural government expenditures are associated with growth in per capita 
agricultural GDP. The net effect of rural expenditures on national income, however, can 
be negative if the additional dollar spent in the non-rural sector would have yielded at  24 
least as large an increase in (non-agricultural) GDP.  The results regarding the effects of 
the structure of public expenditures are therefore more important in practice. The 
empirical analysis indicates that, even without changing overall expenditures, 
governments can improve the economic performance of their agricultural sectors by 
devoting a greater share of those expenditures to social services and public goods instead 
of non-social subsidies.  
  We found no direct or indirect effects on agricultural GDP of generating a 
technocracy by educating students in the U.S., but we did find that the political economy 
of rural expenditures in Latin America is important for understanding the behavior of 
agricultural production. The results suggest that factors such as proportionality, 
presidential system, control of all houses of legislature by the president’s party, and 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization have large and significant effects on agricultural GDP 
through their influence on fiscal policy. Indeed, these effects are larger than those of 
some of the strictly economic variables, such as agricultural prices and openness. 
  Income inequality has an important effect on agricultural GDP through fiscal 
policy, independently of the above political and institutional factors. Inequality is 
associated both with more non-social subsidies and higher rural government 
expenditures.  Our estimates in Table V suggest that the positive rural expenditure level 
effect dominates the negative expenditure composition effect. 
  In sum, reducing the share of non-social subsidies is important for per capita 
agricultural GDP, and political economy factors as well as income inequality 
significantly influence the subsidy-public good allocation of government expenditures. 
Further data collection would be necessary to test whether these findings hold outside of  25 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Knowing the rural public expenditures of a broader 
sample of countries would allow a more robust test of the effects of proportionality and 
presidential systems. But this research agenda should continue to explicitly characterize 
the incentives faced by policymakers to obtain both consistent and interpretable 
elasticities of income with respect to public expenditures.   26 
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Rural Subsidies Data Appendix 
The Food and Agriculture Organization’s Rural Public Expenditure dataset 
contains rural expenditures from 1985 through 2001 in a panel of 18 countries. We 
aggregated the 33 categories of expenditures into our two fiscal policy variables: Rural 
Gov’t Expenditures per Capita and Rural Subsidies Share. One can imagine the difficulty 
that the FAO’s consultants faced in tracking down information on rural government 
expenditures, given that some of the data reflect ill-recorded situations in conflicted areas 
of developing countries nearly twenty years ago. The engaged in an extensive process to 
check and clean the data, and we further scrutinized and modified the dataset after 
receiving it. 
Expenditures at their most disaggregated levels were often non-smooth, and we 
engaged in a substantial process to identify outlying expenditures. Upon identifying a 
data point as unusual, we discussed it with the FAO and their consultants to determine 
whether the data reflected actual expenditures or problems with the recording or reporting 
process.  In many cases significant changes occurred to expenditures as the result of 
changes in ruling party, shifts from autocracy to democracy, and civil unrest. In some 
cases, the data likely did not reflect actual spending, either due to unavailability of 
records or because continuous programs shifted to different departments and could not be 
tracked consistently from year to year. In these cases, data points were dropped. 
Appendix II summarizes the results of the data cleaning effort; the final sample that we 
used has 15 countries with an average of 15.8 observations per country.  
  After cleaning the data, we then calculated the percent share of the expenditures 
devoted to non-social subsidies. This category included all spending on export subsidies,  32 
internal commercialization, forestry subsidies, and targeted rural production subsidies. 
Other categories were in practice not possible to fully assign to one group or the other, as 
the actual public projects executed were of varying types. One-half of expenditures on 
irrigation, integrated rural development, and land purchases and expropriations were thus 
categorized as non-social subsidies.   33 
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean σ-Overall σ-Between σ-Within Min Max
log Ag GDP per Capita 6.7 0.8 0.8 0.2 5.3 8.8
log Ag GDP per Hectare 5.3 0.9 0.9 0.1 3.1 6.9
Government / GDP 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.58
National Public Goods Share 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.42
log Rural Gov't per Capita 4.3 1.2 1.1 0.5 -0.2 7.3
Rural Subsidies Share 0.37 0.22 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.91
log Ag Area per Capita 1.38 1.23 1.26 0.06 -0.90 4.06
log Ag Population per Hectare -1.38 1.23 1.26 0.06 -4.06 0.90
log Non-Ag GDP per Capita 8.7 1.2 1.2 0.2 6.8 11.2
Openness 0.59 0.34 0.32 0.11 0.12 1.99
log Agricultural Price Index -0.09 0.12 0.06 0.11 -0.45 0.16
Mitch Dummy 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.00 1.00
Years of Democratic Stability 3.1 2.2 2.0 1.0 0.0 9.1
Suitable Soil - Best Crop 14.1 9.3 9.5 0.0 2.2 36.1
Suitable Soil - 2nd Best Crop 26.4 6.9 7.1 0.0 10.6 39.2
Percent Land Area in Tropics 0.79 0.36 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
Average Elevation 688.0 492.9 506.5 0.0 18.1 1871.1
log Average Precipitation 7.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 6.4 7.9
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 25.3 20.9 21.4 0.0 4.0 68.0
Election Year Dummy 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.41 0.00 1.00
Gini Coefficient 48.15 5.20 5.34 0.00 41.61 57.28
Presidential Party Has All Houses 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0
Political Competition 8.12 1.89 1.14 1.53 1.00 10.00
Presidential Regime Dummy 0.91 0.28 0.24 0.16 0.00 1.00
Proportionality 1.8 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.0 4.8
Freedom of the Press 40.4 20.5 17.1 11.9 11.0 96.0
Students in U.S. 20-24 Years Ago 5.3 1.1 1.0 0.3 2.7 7.6
Federal Country Dummy 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0
Population Percent Seniors 5.0 2.3 2.3 0.4 2.6 12.6
GDP per Capita 7.7 0.6 0.7 0.1 6.5 9.1   34 
Table II























Argentina $2,895 2.4% 59% $115 $1,078
Bolivia $313 2.8% $17 $223
Brazil $1,482 4.7% 84% $230 $1,254
Chile $2,257 4.5% $902
Columbia $1,258 1.1% $390
Costa Rica $913 2.4% 47% $185 $511
Dominican Republic $537 3.3% 28% $94 $218
Ecuador $955 2.1% 40% $37 $277
Guatemala $571 0.1% 10% $53 $155
Honduras $233 1.9% 8% $17 $151
Jamaica $347 1.2% 57% $28 $847
Mexico $618 1.0% 46% $214 $599
Nicaragua $339 -0.5% 19% $72 $135
Panama $520 1.7% 49% $84 $742
Peru $599 3.7% 39% $51 $396
Paraguay $943 2.1% 26% $31 $244
Uruguay $4,728 3.7% 13% $1,154 $1,617
Venezuela $1,254 1.9% 30% $136 $692   35 
Table III
FE, RE, QFE, and Arellano-Bond Estimators of Agricultural GDP Per Capita
Dependent variable: log of Agricultural GDP per Rural Capita
Specification Fixed Effects Random Effects Quasi-FE Arellano-Bond
Lag of log Ag GDP per Capita 0.846  (0.000)**
Rural Subsidies Share -0.125  (0.104) -0.128  (0.070)* -0.287  (0.001)** -0.062  (0.080)*
log Rural Gov't per Capita 0.038  (0.015)** 0.034  (0.024)** 0.028  (0.158) 0.019  (0.018)**
log Ag Area per Capita 0.359  (0.015)** 0.235  (0.002)** 0.160  (0.000)** 0.031  (0.016)**
log Non-Ag GDP per Capita 0.521  (0.000)** 0.450  (0.000)** 0.303  (0.000)** 0.046  (0.037)**
Openness 0.083  (0.201) 0.063  (0.306) -0.213  (0.000)** -0.037  (0.121)
log Agricultural Price Index -0.073  (0.505) -0.083  (0.441) 0.495  (0.012)** 0.149  (0.113)
Mitch Dummy -0.084  (0.189) -0.090  (0.161) -0.201  (0.137) -0.103  (0.059)*
R^2
Within 0.611 0.607 0.430
Between 0.832 0.830 0.958
Overall 0.823 0.822 0.942
Observations 239 239 239 218
Sargan Test P-Value 0.235
Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test P-Value 0.585
P-values are in parenthesis. 
* Signficant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
Lagged values of all independent variables were used, except for the log Agricultural Price Index and the Mitch Dummy  36 
Table IV
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Agricultural GDP Per Capita
Dependent Variable Log(Ag. GDP p.c.) Private-subsidy share log(Public Rural Exp.)
Independent Variables
log Rural Gov't per Capita 0.188  (0.000)**
Rural Subsidies Share -0.529  (0.000)**
log Ag Area per Capita  0.193  (0.000)** 0.129  (0.002)** 0.206  (0.315)
log Non-Ag GDP per Capita  0.157  (0.000)** 0.072  (0.010)** 1.460  (0.000)**
Openness  -0.176  (0.029)** 0.180  (0.010)** 0.496  (0.145)
log Agricultural Price Index 0.591  (0.007)** -0.203  (0.064)* -1.212  (0.034)**
Mitch Dummy -0.115  (0.390) 0.025  (0.707) 0.176  (0.620)
Years of Democratic Stability 0.123  (0.000)**
Suitable Soil - Best Crop 0.018  (0.000)**
Suitable Soil - 2nd Best Crop 0.055  (0.000)**
Percent Land Area in Tropics 0.441  (0.059)*
Average Elevation -0.001  (0.000)**
log Average Precipitation -0.545  (0.000)**
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.019  (0.000)** 0.006  (0.000)** -0.015  (0.025)**
Election Year Dummy -0.007  (0.696) 0.000  (0.996)
Gini Coefficient 0.015  (0.025)** 0.150  (0.000)**
Years of Democratic Stability 0.033  (0.000)** -0.195  (0.000)**
Political Competition 0.027  (0.005)** 0.066  (0.150)
Presidential Regime Dummy -0.092  (0.024)** 0.888  (0.000)**
Proportionality 0.043  (0.035)** 0.141  (0.138)
Freedom of the Press -0.002  (0.000)** -0.008  (0.006)**
Students in U.S. 20-24 Years Ago 0.124  (0.000)** 0.318  (0.006)**
Federal Country Dummy 0.326  (0.000)** -1.549  (0.000)**
Population Percent Seniors -0.088  (0.001)** -0.712  (0.000)**
R^2 0.951 0.850 0.818
Observations 218 218 218
P-values are in parenthesis, based on robust small-sample standard errors.
* Signficant at 10%
** Significant at 5%   37 
Table V. 






Rural Exp. Overall Pvalue Mean σ-Overall σ-Between σ-Within
log Rural Gov't per Capita 0.188 0.188 0.000 4.290 1.212 1.142 0.469
Rural Subsidies Share -0.529 -0.529 0.000 0.366 0.224 0.209 0.104
log Ag Area per Capita  0.193 -0.068 0.039 -0.030 0.004 1.383 1.230 1.262 0.060
log Non-Ag GDP per Capita  0.157 -0.038 0.274 0.236 0.000 8.750 1.163 1.178 0.197
Openness -0.176 -0.095 0.093 -0.002 0.068 0.589 0.335 0.324 0.114
log Agricultural Price Index 0.591 0.107 -0.228 -0.121 0.015 -0.089 0.120 0.057 0.107
Years of Democratic Stability 0.123 -0.017 -0.037 -0.054 0.000 3.086 2.216 2.025 1.013
Mitch Dummy -0.115 -0.013 0.033 0.020 0.431 0.009 0.093 0.020 0.091
Suitable Soil - Best Crop 0.018 -0.019 0.043 0.024 0.001 14.060 9.270 9.525 0.000
Suitable Soil - 2ndBest Crop 0.055 -0.024 0.029 0.005 0.000 26.398 6.871 7.060 0.000
Percent Land Area in Tropics 0.441 -0.532 0.033 -0.498 0.836 0.788 0.356 0.365 0.000
Average Elevation -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 687.991 492.904 506.452 0.000
log Average Precipitation -0.545 0.210 0.247 0.458 0.443 7.363 0.466 0.479 0.000
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.019 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 25.278 20.876 21.450 0.000
Election Year Dummy 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.822 0.213 0.410 0.066 0.405
Gini Coefficient -0.008 0.028 0.020 0.010 48.155 5.196 5.339 0.000
Political Competition -0.014 0.012 -0.002 0.832 8.121 1.889 1.141 1.529
Presidential Regime Dummy 0.049 0.167 0.216 0.000 0.912 0.283 0.241 0.159
Proportionality -0.023 0.026 0.004 0.847 1.824 1.094 1.164 0.374
Freedom of the Press 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.804 40.398 20.467 17.139 11.859
Students in U.S. 20-24 Years Ago -0.065 0.060 -0.006 0.830 5.272 1.052 1.039 0.295
Population Percent Seniors 0.047 -0.134 -0.087 0.012 5.013 2.268 2.299 0.371  38 
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Appendix I
Variables in Rural Subsidies Dataset
Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
log Ag GDP per Capita Log of agricultural GDP per rural capita WDI
log Ag GDP per Hectare Log of agricultural GDP per hectare of agricultural land WDI
Government / GDP Consolidated government expenditures as a share of GDP FAO, IMF
National Public Goods Share Share of public goods in national government expenditures
Independent Variables
log Rural Gov't per Capita Log of rural public expenditures per rural capita FAO
Rural Subsidies Share Shrare of subsidies in rural expenditures FAO
log Ag Area per Capita Log of agricultural land area (hectares) per capita FAO
log Non-Ag GDP per Capita Log of total non-agricultural GDP per rural capita WDI
Openness ( Imports + Exports ) / GDP WDI
log Agricultural Price Index Log of the divisia price index of agricultural production Authors
Mitch Dummy Dummy in 1999 for countries affected by Hurricane Mitch Authors
Quasi-Fixed Effects Variables
Suitable Soil - Best Crop Percent of land area suitable for best of six major crops Gallup
Suitable Soil - 2nd Best Crop Percent of land area suitable for second best of six major crops Gallup
Percent Land Area in Tropics Percent of land area in the geographical tropics Gallup
Average Elevation Country mean elevation (meters above sea level) Gallup
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Ethnolinguistic fractionalization Collier
log Average Precipitation Log of average precipitation (cm/year) from 1980-2000. Mitchell
Instrumental Variables
Election Year Dummy Election year dummy DPI
Gini Coefficient Average of Gini coefficients across studies Various
Political Competition Political competition rating Polity
Presidential Regime Dummy Presidential regime dummy DPI
Proportionality Proportional electoral system interacted with district size DPI
Freedom of the Press Freedom of the press rating by Freedom House Freedom
Students in U.S. 20-24 Years Ago
log of the average number of students per million population enrolled in 
US colleges and universities between 20 and 25 years before Open Doors
Years of Democratic Stability The square root of the number of years of consecutive democratic rule Polity
Federal Country Dummy Federal country dummy Authors
Controls in political economy regressions
Population Percent Seniors Multiple terms WDI
GDP per Capita log of country GDP per capita WDI
Sources
WDI World Development Indicators, World Bank
FAO United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
Mitchell
Mitchell T.D. and Jones P.D. 2005. "An improved method of constructing 
a database of monthly climate observations and associated high-
resolution grids." International Journal of Climatology, 25: 693–712.
Gallup
Gallup, John L. and Jeffrey D. Sachs, with Andrew Mellinger. "Geography 
and Economic Development" CID Working Paper no. 1, March 1999.
Collier
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler, 1998, On economic causes of civil war. 
Oxford Economic Papers 50, 563–573.
Freedom
Freedom House Country Ratings. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm
DPI
Database of Political Institutions. Beck, T, G Clarke, A Groff, P Keefer, 
and P Walsh. New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political 
Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Working 
Paper 2283.
Polity 
University of Maryland Polity IV Database. 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm
Open Doors Institute for International Education. http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/
Notes
All figures are in real 1995 United States dollars.
"L" beginning a variable name indicates a lagged value
"C" ending a variable name indicates normalization by population
"H" ending a variable name indicates normalization by land area
"l" beginning a variable name indicates a log   40 
Appendix II
Country-Level Revisions to FAO Rural Public Expenditures Dataset
Country Years Problem Change
DR, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela All
Uncertain of revisions made between 2003 and 
2005 2003 FAO data used
Bolivia, Columbia All Data not disaggregated Dropped PSubM observations
El Salvador, Cuba All Insufficient data Dropped country
Chile All FAO re-estimating data Dropped country
All All Reported sums do not equal category sums Used sums of expenditures in each category
Brazil 1985 Low outlier Dropped observation
Brazil 2000, 2001 Accounting system changed Dropped observations
Jamaica 1985, 1986, 2001 Expenditures not disaggregated Dropped observations
Jamaica 1990, 1991 Expenditures not disaggregated PSubM interpolated between surrounding values
Mexico 1985, 1986 Accounting system changed Dropped observations
Paraguay 1985, 1986 Spending by decentralized entities not available Dropped observations   41 
Table AIII
FE and RE, QFE, and Arellano-Bond Estimators of Agricultural GDP Per Hectare
Dependent variable: log of Agricultural GDP per Agricultural Hectare
Specification Fixed Effects Random Effects Quasi-FE Arellano-Bond
Lag of log Ag GDP per Hectare 0.825  (0.000)**
Rural Subsidies Share -0.120  (0.115) -0.119  (0.088)* -0.281  (0.001)** 0.071  (0.004)**
log Rural Population per Hectare 0.083  (0.518) 0.286  (0.000)** 0.027  (0.182) -0.078  (0.033)**
log Rural Gov't per Hectare 0.039  (0.012)** 0.035  (0.021)** 0.513  (0.000)** 0.020  (0.018)**
log Urban GDP per Hectare 0.497  (0.000)** 0.434  (0.000)** 0.298  (0.000)** 0.049  (0.032)**
Openness 0.101  (0.114) 0.079  (0.194) -0.212  (0.000)** -0.038  (0.118)
log Agricultural Price Index -0.069  (0.527) -0.077  (0.474) 0.501  (0.011)** 0.159  (0.102)
Mitch Dummy -0.080  (0.207) -0.086  (0.177) -0.201  (0.142) -0.102  (0.072)*
R^2
Within 0.614 0.609 0.437
Between 0.685 0.819 0.956
Overall 0.669 0.807 0.939
Observations 239 239 239 218
Sargan Test P-Value 0.377
Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test P-Value 0.553
P-values are in parenthesis. 
* Signficant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
Lagged values of all independent variables were used, except for the log Agricultural Price Index and the Mitch Dummy   42 
Appendix IV
First Stage of 3SLS Estimation of Agricultural GDP Per Capita
Dependent Variable




log Rural Gov't 
per Capita
Independent Variables
log Ag Area per Capita 0.167  (0.001)** 0.129  (0.002)** 0.202  (0.361)
log Non-Ag GDP per Capita 0.485  (0.000)** 0.070  (0.013)** 1.314  (0.000)**
Openness 0.028  (0.738) 0.174  (0.013)** 0.167  (0.647)
log Agricultural Price Index 0.269  (0.042)** -0.197  (0.072)* -0.891  (0.122)
Mitch Dummy -0.079  (0.332) 0.025  (0.712) 0.150  (0.674)
Years of Democratic Stability 0.036  (0.001)** 0.034  (0.000)** -0.143  (0.003)**
Suitable Soil - Best Crop 0.044  (0.000)** 0.036  (0.000)** 0.223  (0.000)**
Suitable Soil - 2nd Best Crop 0.041  (0.000)** 0.045  (0.000)** 0.185  (0.000)**
Percent Land Area in Tropics -0.061  (0.785) 1.006  (0.000)** 0.185  (0.851)
Average Elevation 0.000  (0.000)** 0.000  (0.000)** -0.001  (0.083)*
log Average Precipitation 0.338  (0.004)** -0.409  (0.000)** 0.640  (0.209)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.008  (0.000)** 0.007  (0.000)** -0.009  (0.207)
Election Year Dummy 0.014  (0.504) -0.007  (0.684) -0.016  (0.861)
Gini Coefficient -0.002  (0.839) 0.016  (0.020)** 0.184  (0.000)**
Political Competition 0.001  (0.921) 0.027  (0.006)** 0.060  (0.240)
Presidential Regime Dummy 0.189  (0.000)** -0.092  (0.026)** 0.930  (0.000)**
Proportionality -0.039  (0.110) 0.044  (0.031)** 0.210  (0.051)*
Freedom of the Press -0.002  (0.009)** -0.002  (0.000)** -0.005  (0.114)
Students in U.S. 20-24 Years Ago -0.181  (0.000)** 0.128  (0.000)** 0.598  (0.000)**
Federal Country Dummy -0.433  (0.000)** 0.325  (0.000)** -1.597  (0.000)**
Population Percent Seniors -0.135  (0.000)** -0.087  (0.001)** -0.636  (0.000)**
R^2 0.983 0.850 0.836
Observations 218 218 218
P-values are in parenthesis, based on robust small-sample standard errors.
* Signficant at 10%
** Significant at 5%  